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Weather. Price. Revenue. Income. Health. All are risks that farmers face as they go about the business of 
producing the food and fiber for this nation and many others. Farmers have long sought to reduce their 
risks, using a number of tools including ones taken on their own, through the private sector and some 
from the U.S. government.  
 
Some ways to manage risk are as simple as the decisions made in a given farming operation. The annual 
decision of what crop mix to plant for the growing season is one of the most basic of risk management 
tools used by producers. A crop-based producer wanting to maximize income will look at a cropping 
mix from a different perspective than a livestock producer who actually needs to use the commodities 
grown as a basic need for the farming operation. 
 
The U.S. agriculture of the 1950s saw many areas of the U.S. Midwest with operations raising cattle, 
hogs, sheep, poultry and crops such as corn, soybeans, oats and hay needed to sustain that livestock 
production. Those broadly diversified operations were a form of risk management for the operator -- it 
would be most unlikely for prices/returns for all of the segments of the farm to be depressed at the same 
time. And consumption on the farm -- to sustain the farm family -- was another reason for the actions 
taken on the production side of the equation. 
 
But as U.S. agriculture has evolved, these layers of diversification have been slowly pared. Many 
Midwestern farms have livestock buildings present but are standing empty as crop production has 
become more of a farming staple. And those farmers opting to go "strictly" to crop production had 
decisions to make on their cropping mix as they no longer had to consider that a portion of the crop -- 
sometimes a considerable amount -- was to be utilized as livestock. So from that perspective, their crop 
risk was more on production, than price when commodities were produced as part of a diversified 
operation.  
 
Yet those risks to an operation are still there. Instead of needing to reserve say 30% of production on a 
farm just to feed horses when those were used to power the farm's equipment, now a farmer is faced 
with covering that "feed" in a fuel bill to operate the machinery that is used for planting, 
cultivating/spraying, harvesting, storing and marketing that crop or crops. That has moved crop 
production more onto the same footing as livestock production in terms of having both price and 
production risks. 
 
For the price side of risk, a cash forward contract is one of the basic tools utilized by producers. Many 
utilize this function in marketing their farm's crop output. The forward contract can typically be entered 
at nearly any time of the year, with options ranging from "spot" or immediate delivery to deferred 
delivery such as new crop -- after the crop growing in the field or to be planted in the field is harvested.   
 Even though the price underlying the cash forward contract comes from the futures market, the producer 
can enter into the contract with the margin calls associated with a futures position. While the producer 
has capped out his price via the contract, he has also transferred the price risk to the elevator. In times as 
we are currently seeing, the use of the cash forward contract can lock in attractive and profitable prices 
for producers of corn, soybeans and wheat.    
 
However, the cash forward contract can be limited in terms of the length of time that the producer can 
cover his production. Even though there are futures contracts trading that will cover the 2008 or even 
2009 crop year, it is unlikely that the producer can utilize a cash forward contract to cover this 
production. This may be an area for policy-makers to explore in the future -- how to make this tool more 
available for producers to utilize. That may involve providing elevators or grain buyers some type of 
incentive to encourage them to offer coverage to a farmer further out than just one crop season or 
portions of two crop seasons.  
 
When it comes to the production side of risk, farmers, the private sector and the government haven't 
been able to devise a way to make it rain -- or quit raining! The use of crop insurance with "buy-up" 
coverage has been an increasing tool producers use to help mitigate -- not eliminate -- their production 
and/or risk. The tools now available go beyond multi-peril losses such as wind or hail, but can help to 
address revenue shortfalls.  
 
But expanded use of the various crop insurance tools has not come without some cost. As USDA notes, 
$3.1 billion was the average cost for the federal government over 2002-2005. Three-quarters of what the 
government spends is on premium subsidies to convince farmers to buy higher rates of coverage. Those 
subsidies have worked to bring more farmers into the program, including those in areas where they 
typically did not utilize the program as they rarely suffered crop damage severe enough to reap a 
payment. The advent and broadening of tools that address revenue and risk have attracted many 
producers into the program.  
 
But despite the broad availability of crop insurance options and support via the farm program, much of 
this aid is targeted to program crops (feed grains, food grains, upland cotton and soybeans) sugar and 
dairy, as USDA points out.  
 
Ad hoc disaster programs approved by Congress have injected still more risk minimization by the 
government. But as growers have discovered for losses suffered in the 2005 and 2006 crop years, this 
type of risk management is highly unpredictable. Many times the aid will get snared by other political 
concerns, keeping it as a non-guaranteed source of risk protection. 
 
As we have seen the growth of risk management tools in recent years via the crop insurance program 
and the U.S. farm program, the concepts we now view as common often began as an idea among just a 
handful of people. Over time and as growing numbers of producers enjoyed success with a certain 
insurance tool, more and more growers flocked to these tools.  
 
That is to say, perhaps the risk management tool that will become the future blueprint has yet to be 
"thought of" or devised. Or, perhaps it is already out there being used but not to what will eventually be 
its full potential. This means the U.S. should challenge itself to not just reserve the term "research" for 
lab or field experiments, but to research and develop the best tools for farmers to use as they seek to 
address the risks faced in their operations.  
 
USDA's risk management paper laid out some suggested alternatives:  
Alternative 1:  Use the existing structure of farm programs, but make them more WTO consistent, 
reduce their effects on resource use and structure, and better target them to producers with the 
greatest need  for assistance.   
 
The direct payments started as the basis of the Freedom to Farm version of U.S. farm policy and have 
proven an effective way -- or at least a reliable way -- of delivering farm program benefits to producers. 
The structure put in place to the make payments has also been a way for USDA to deliver supplemental 
payments. If more funds were shifted away from the marketing loan program and Counter-cyclical 
payment (CCP) program and moved into direct payments, at least no new structure and software 
redesign would be required. 
 
Farmers receiving direct payments would likely appreciate the simple aspect of this route as it would 
take little action on their part. Of course there are still other aspects of complying with farm program 
requirements that would still require a certain amount of actions, but growers would be mostly 
unfettered to respond more directly to market signals. Depending on the level of reduction in loan rates 
for the marketing loan program, grower use would likely decline as predicted by USDA. Of course, 
that's assuming that market prices would continue to be higher -- or at least remain at levels which 
would minimize outlays for the loan program. 
 
However, shifting more dollars to farmers via the direct payment route would continue to provide fodder 
for those seeking to focus on the transfer of taxpayer dollars to farmers. Unless the increase in direct 
payments was accompanied by tighter to considerably tighter payment limits, this focus would continue 
to erode support for farm programs. Congress has so far proven unwilling to make major adjustments in 
the pay caps. As USDA correctly points out, the impacts are greatest in areas where cotton and rice 
production is prevalent. And southern lawmakers continue to turn back efforts to significantly tighten 
payment limits. So it's not clear that efforts to tighten payments would be successful.   
 
USDA's proposal to eliminate farm program payments to those whose three-year average adjusted gross 
income was $200,000 or more continues to generate considerable questions and comments from our 
newsletter subscribers. And not all the growers who would be affected by such a shift in farm programs 
are the "big" producers. Clearly, even though commodity prices are currently strong, growers view such 
a proposal on payment limits as a potentially onerous situation that would increase their risk. 
 
Removing the acreage restriction on fruits and vegetables on base acres would have to involve some 
type of compensation for current growers. Many current fruit and vegetable growers aren't looking for a 
direct payment and do not want to be brought under the farm program umbrella. Rather, as USDA has 
proposed in its farm bill, these growers seek to have funding  put toward research and efforts like extra 
purchases of fruits and vegetables for government nutrition and feeding programs. 
 
When talking about pay caps, it also continues a debate that has gone on for years. However, if current 
commodity prices are sustained for an extended period, that could reduce some of the resistance to 
altering farm program payment limitations and targeting of those payments.  
 
 
Alternative 2:  Replace marketing assistance loans and counter-cyclical payments with a program 
that pays producers based on revenue shortfalls.   
 Under this alternative, ending the marketing loan and CCP programs to put a revenue-based program in 
place would involve a significant shift in farm program spending. And, it would also increase the need 
for growers to become familiar with a new form of government farm programs. However, those 
currently using some type of revenue-based crop insurance program would have some idea of what 
would likely be involved with such a program. 
 
The record-keeping requirements that would go along with a revenue-based program could be 
substantial, especially for growers with a more-diverse operation. Keeping farm programs simple can 
certainly be a factor in how programs are viewed by producers.  
 
Those in the insurance industry, which include farmer-member groups such as Farm Bureau, would 
certainly have issues with a potential situation where their business could be ended or significantly 
curtailed. That could have economic impacts and add risk for producers. 
 
And, some of the concepts proposed to date would further expose regional differences that exist in 
agriculture and keep some of those "north-south" divisions alive.  
 
Alternative 3:  Phase out marketing assistance loans, direct payments, and counter-cyclical 
payments, and use savings to expand crop insurance coverage, fund farm savings accounts and/or 
expand conservation, rural development, or other programs.   
 
Expanding conservation programs in exchange for doing away with marketing assistance loans, CCPs 
and direct payments would certainly have the potential to lower farm program outlays. Increasing 
conservation program payments would no doubt be welcomed in farm country, especially if they were 
run in a way to maximize conservation benefits in exchange for payments.  
 
The Conservation Security Program (CSP) would seem to be an excellent candidate for an expanded 
role in efforts to address risk in agriculture. The program has suffered a dimmed view in many areas of 
farm country given the relatively small level of funding that Congress has provided for USDA to operate 
the effort. To expand the program would have to be accompanied by a renewed effort to reacquaint 
farmers with the program. 
 
Others such as the Environmental Quality Incentives Program (EQIP) would help target more livestock 
operations and help them meet what may well be higher environmental standards relative to programs 
run by other government agencies, such as the Environmental Protection Agency. The program has 
enjoyed a positive stance for the most part in farm country. While a program certainly doesn't have to be 
"popular" to be used, it certainly doesn't hurt in terms of implementation and farmer education. 
 
No doubt European Union (EU) officials would welcome the "greening" of the American farm program 
as a nod to some of their concepts. The farm program under this type of shift would no doubt be easier 
to justify to taxpayers as it there could be a proven a benefit to the country from the practices undertaken 
in exchange for payments. Farmers and non-farmer environmentalists would be able to be partners in the 
process, changing what can at times has been an adversarial relationship. 
 
Still, an increased role of environmental regulations could chase some producers from the program and 
that could in turn reduce some of the positive environmental benefits. That is at least one aspect of our 
current system in that those producers who do receive government payments have to undertake a certain 
level of land stewardship. Effectively chasing these producers from farm programs would increase their 
risk and force them to concentrate more on private-sector approaches to risk management.  
The bottom line remains that no matter what type of changes are to be contemplated for U.S. farm policy 
in terms of helping producers address the risks they face, they must provide a benefit to the farmer -- 
ideally financially address price/revenue risks -- while protecting the integrity of the program with the 
American taxpayer.  
 
As with any of the possibilities suggested by USDA, there are always the times of unintended 
consequences. The current situation with ethanol is one of those cases. The demand base created by 
ethanol production has given corn, soybean and wheat producers profitable pricing opportunities. But 
those profitable price levels are creating issues for livestock producers as they see their feed costs rising. 
That will be the major test of any change in direction for U.S. farm programs -- who will be the winners 
and losers.  